Defending Euthyphro
I wrote a paper on this subject a couple of years ago in philosophy and thought it might be a good idea to share now. Take a look.
This paper refers to two documents, the Euthyphro by Plato, and Is There Such a Thing as the Teleological Suspension of the Ethical By Kierkegaard.
Euthyphro: http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/euthyfro.html
Kierkegaard: I wish I could find the text, but I can't. Sorry.
In Plato’s Euthyphro, Euthyphro finds himself in a discussion with Socrates about the nature of what is holy. The primary question Socratese asks Euthypro is “Is a thing holy because it is loved by the gods or is it loved by the gods because it is holy?” My attempt in defending Euthyphro’s argument is not to defend Euthyphro, for Euthyphro argues in a circle and answers the above question with both alternatives. Furthermore, Socrates forces Euthyphro into several contradictions of himself. I cannot defend a contradiction, and since that is what made up Euthyphro’s argument, I cannot defend the argument. Rather, my aim is to show that answering Socrates question does not force a contradiction.
First, I must say that I am arguing from a slightly different standpoint than is Euthyphro. Euthyphro’s argument suffered a weakness because it was imbedded in polytheism, and the Greek gods were inconsistent in what they valued. A monotheistic system of beliefs avoids this weakness, and Socrates moves on from this criticism later in his question of Euthyphro, so inconsistencies in the deities will not be considered here, because the problem is irrelevant to monotheism. I will also use the term God throughout the paper rather than “the gods” of whom Socrates and Euthyphro speak.
The question still must be answered. Is a thing holy because God loves it, or does God love it because it is holy? My answer, is that a thing is holy because God loves it. Unfortunately, Socrates never really replied to Euthyphro on this point, because after Euthyphro said this, he realized that he had contradicted himself, and ran away. The only challenge of this position that is made in any of the texts for the semester is by Kierkegaard, and his criticism only applies to ethical situations, which will be discussed later.
The most apparent problem with this answer that I have suggested is what if God said something horrible like torturing babies is holy? If God is the standard, then anything God says goes, so he (I am using the male pronoun only for simplicity) technically has the authority to consider torturing babies as holy. If God wanted to, he could have created the universe in such a way that anything that is considered abominable could be virtuous.
However, assuming an omnipotent, omniscient, self-existing, creator God, access to understanding what he finds holy or good can be found it what he created and how he created it. The very notion that some things in this world seem to be absolute, such as torturing babies is wrong, shows that a creator God created the world in such a way where torturing babies is wrong. If God is as described above, he must be the foundation for all existence. He is self-existent, the universe is not, and he existed before the universe. He also created it and gave it the attributes that he chose. So, to speak of any attribute as having apparent value apart from how God views it or accepts it is utter nonsense. What can exist inside a universe that God created that is other than what God created? If this God exists, it seems to be logically necessary that all of the definitions for goodness and holiness be found in him.
It is here that Kierkegaard errs as well. The key premise of Kierkegaard’s argument condemning Abraham is not applicable in a world with an omniscient, omnipotent, self-existing, creator God. The first seven words in Kierkegaard’s “Is There Such a Thing as the Teleological Suspension of the Ethical” are “The ethical as such is the universal.” If God exists, God is the universal, not the ethical. The ethical certainly is experienced by everyone, but the ethical is and must be derived from God. Kierkegaard’s entire argument hinges on this premise. If he had stated that because men cannot know who God is, men must seek the ethical because it is the highest thing that men can know. However, this does not apply to Abraham, who does not suffer from the epistemological problem. The same God who promised Abraham a son by two people who are past child-bearing (Genesis 17:17-19) brought it about (Gen. 21:1-2) and then commanded him to sacrifice (Genesis 22:2). Abraham knew this was God speaking to him. Kierkegaard is arguing that God must be subject in what he commands by ethics that he has created. This makes sense from a humanistic standpoint, but logically it is awkward. Did God restrict himself when he gave men moral sensibilities?
This is not exactly a defense of Euthyphro. I have argued from the position that Socrates forced Euthyphro into accepting. I believe that it is a logically viable position if it assumed that God does indeed exist, and its foundation is in God. People disagree about who God is and what God finds to be good or holy, but this does not affect the theory proposed in this paper, it does however make it hard to follow practically. However, a problem in epistemology does not imply that the theory itself is false.
